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IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MARYLAN
x
RAPHAEL J. OSHEROFF,
Plaintiff,
v. Law No. 66024
CHESTNUT LODGE, INC., : MANUEL ROSS, M.D., : C. WESLEY DINGMAN, M.D., :
Defendants. :
: x
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MOTION RAISING PRELIMINARY OBJECTION

ALL INQUIRIES

May 2, 1984

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1	IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MARYLAND
2	x
3	RAPHAEL J. OSHEROFF,
4	Plaintiff,
5	v. : Law No. 66024 :
6	CHESTNUT LODGE, INC., : MANUEL ROSS, M.D., : C. WESLEY DINGMAN, M.D., :
7	: Defendants. :
8	: x
9	Rockville, Maryland
10	May 2, 1984
11	WHEREUPON, proceedings in the above-entitled
12	matter commenced
13	BEFORE: THE HONORABLE RICHARD B. LATHAM, Judge
14	APPEARANCES:
15	FOR THE PLAINTIFF:
16	PHILIP P. HIRSCHKOP, Esq. JOHN D. GRAD, Esq. DAVID J. FUDALA, Esq.
17	108 North Columbua Street Post Office Box 1226
18	Alexandria, Virginia 22313
19	ROBERT SALZER, Esq. 1320 Fenwick Lane Silver Spring, Maryland 20910
20	FOR THE DEFENDANTS:
21	WILLIAM A. EHRMANTRAUT, Esq. 51 Monroe Street, Suite 700
22	Rockville, Maryland 20850
23	JAMES F. ROSNER, Esq. ALFRED L. SCANLAN, JR., Esq.
24	2000 First Maryland Building 25 South Charles Street
25	Baltimore, Maryland 21201

PROCEEDINGS

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THE CLERK: Law Number 66024, Osheroff v. Chestnut Lodge, et al..

THE COURT: You gentlemen want to identify yourself as to who you are and who you represent in this case.

MR. ROSNER: Your Honor, I am James Rosner, and I represent Chestnut Lodge.

THE COURT: How do -- R-O-S-N-E-R?

MR. ROSNER: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. EHRMANTRAUT: William Ehrmantraut, attorney for the Defendants, Dr. Ross and Dr. Dingman.

MR. SALZER: Your Honor, Robert Salzer for the Plaintiff. I have entered my appearance this morning for the sole purpose of being Maryland Counsel to Mr. Philip Hirschkop sitting on my right who is an out-of-state Counsel.

MR. HIRSCHKOP: Your Honor, Philip Hirschkop, and I represent the Plaintiff, Rapheal Osheroff.

MR. SALZER: Your Honor, I would move at this time to admit Mr. Hirschkop for purposes of trying this Mr. Hirschkop is a member of the Bar of the State of Virginia. He is a member in good standing of that Bar. He has not tried a case in the State of Maryland in the

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last 12 months. Now, a formal motion has not been submitted to the Court, and that is why I move him at this time. His Maryland Counsel did not appear today.

THE COURT: We better get this thing started off on the right foot. I do not know what Mr. Hirschkop is doing out here practicing law in our jurisdiction. As I understand, you have not been admitted in this case, is that right?

MR. HIRSCHKOP: No sir, I did argue the panel hearing, Your Honor. I was here for three weeks in the panel hearing. We do have Maryland Counsel on the papers that indicate --

THE COURT: Well, do not tell me about Maryland Counsel. We have rules over here how to do these things, and I do not understand lawyers filing pleadings in proceedings that they are not members of the Bar before they are properly before the Court.

MR. HIRSCHKOP: Your Honor, our advice was we were doing it properly. It was not until this morning Mr.

Salzer informed me for the first time that it was not in conformity. That is why we brought it to your attention immediately, but we certainly will file whatever is necessary, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Well, there is not any motion here that has been filed in this Court, and you have been

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apparently filing pleadings in here on a regular basis.

MR. HIRSCHKOP: Your Honor, I will attend to that as soon as I get back to the office. I did not realize it was a violation -- what was happening. I have not filed those pleadings, but I certainly take responsibility for my office.

THE COURT: What is your name?

MR. SALZER: Robert Salzer, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Who is John D. Grad, G-R-A-D?

MR. SALZER: John Grad, Your Honor, is a partner in form --

THE COURT: Is he a member of the Maryland Bar?

MR. SALZER: No, Your Honor, but Michael Abelson, Esquire, is who has joined as Counsel in the original pleadings. At least that is what I have been lead to understand this morning. Mr. Abelson could not appear this morning and apparently did not inform Mr. Hirschkop of the necessity to make a special motion to be admitted for purposes of a single case. His name is appearing on the pleadings, Your Honor, Michael Abelson, Esquire.

THE COURT: Well, are you prepared to argue this?

MR. SALZER: Mr. Hirschkop is prepared.

THE COURT: That question is directed to you.

MR. SALZER: No, Your Honor, I am not prepared to argue it. I have this morning taken the time to read the

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motion.

THE COURT: Well, Mr. Hirschkop cannot argue it because he is not before the Court properly, and you are not prepared to argue I take it. Do you know Mr. Abelson, Mr. Hirschkop?

MR. HIRSCHKOP: I have never met him personally.

I have spoken with him on the phone, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Did you people do anything about checking with the Maryland Rules for Practice and Procedure before you came over here and filed this lawsuit in our Court?

MR. HIRSCHKOP: We checked with Mr. Abelson, Your Honor, in light of his advice on it. We had brought it --

THE COURT: Are you telling me that he advised you to go ahead and file a lawsuit over here in which you sign your name as Counsel of record without even being admitted?

MR. HIRSCHKOP He was on the lawsuit also, Your Honor. Yes, we thought that was the proper form. If it was a mistake, we certainly will correct it, Your Honor. It was not an effort to defraud the Court in any way or to deceive the Court, and we do practice extensively in other states. The procedure, apparently, in Maryland is not the common procedure in other states. So it is purely --

THE COURT: When you go to other states, you

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file -- a Maryland lawyer goes over to Virginia, a Maryland lawyer is expected by the Court over there to follow the rules or practices and procedure over there --

MR. HIRSCHKOP: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Would you agree with that, sir? MR. HIRSCHKOP: What happens over there, Your Honor, is they just admit on a motion pro hoc viche by resident Counsel. I would ask for leave of the Court and

viche today, and we will file the appropriate pleading.

would just argue that these are very short motions pro hoc

I take it you have not even met Mr. THE COURT: Abelson?

MR. HIRSCHKOP: He has met with the other lawyers I have not personally met, no sir, Your Honor. At the arbitration, it was determined that Maryland Counsel did not have to be present. There were a lot of proceedings before that, and I think it was worked out with the Attorney General's Office actually as to whether or not Maryland Counsel was required. At the administrative end of a proceeding, it was determined they were not required.

I spoke to Mr. Abelson just last night, Your Honor.

Did anybody in your firm ever discuss THE COURT: with him about the procedures of having a Viriginia lawyer come over here and practice law in the State of Maryland?

MR. HIRSCHKOP: Yes sir, that was looked into extensively at the arbitration panels. There was a question whether we could be here without him or not, and as I say, there was carte blanche with the Attorney General's Office, and there may have been some pleadings filed along those lines. It was not something we just ignored, Your Honor. It was something we did look into --

THE COURT: You certainly do not relate what we are doing here in this Courthouse with an arbitration proceeding, do you, Mr. Hirschkop?

MR. HIRSCHKOP: No sir, I do not. I am not unmindful of rules, Your Honor. I am on the governing body of the Virginia State Bar, and when I saw what happened this morning, I immediately said we will get the proper pleadings filed and bring it to the Court's attention which is why Co-Counsel got up initially to make it known to Your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Rosner, you have some motions in here apparently. Do you want to go first?

MR. EHRMANTRAUT. Let me say this, Your Honor, on behalf of Mr. Rosner. His motion is the same as my motion, and he will argue on behalf of all the Defendants rather than have me repeat. I may briefly add something, but we are trying to keep the time --

THE COURT: As I understand it, there is a Motion

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to Strike the Jury Demand, but that becomes moot if the preliminary objection is granted.

MR. EHRMANTRAUT: That is correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. EHRMANTRAUT: I would request that Mr. Rosner speak on behalf of all Defendants.

THE COURT: All right. 15 minutes. That does not mean you have to take 15.

MR. ROSNER: May it please the Court, we have two motions. If Your Honor pleases, I will argue the Motion Raising Preliminary Objection first, and if necessary, address the Motion to Strike if that is suitable with you?

THE COURT: Go ahead.

MR. ROSNER: Okay. Basically we have raised three issues in our Motion Raising Preliminary Objection.

The first issue, Your Honor, is that the Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction to hear this case because no declaration has ever been filed pursuant to the B-Y Rules of Maryland Procedure.

The second issue that we have addressed is that there insufficiency of service of process in this case. The third issue is that the arbitration determination that was made by the arbitration panel was improperly made and should be vacated.

Now addressing the subject matter of jurisdiction

argument. In this case on January 11th of 1984, the Health Claims arbitration panel served an amended arbitration determination. On January 17th of 1984, the Defendants filed a Notice of Rejection of that award, and they also filed an Action to Nullify.

The B-Y Rules have to be read in conjunction with the Maryland Arbitration Statute. The statute says that the Notice of Rejection has to be filed within 30 days of service of the award. The statute also says that an Action to Nullify must be filed in the Circuit Court within 30 days of serving of the award. The B-Y Rules then say within days after the Action to Nullify is filed, the Plaintiffs are required to file a declaration in Court.

The Health Claims arbitration statute specifically provides that the filing of the declaration in the Circuit Court must be pursuant to the Maryland Rules of Procedure, and I would cite to the Court the statute is 3-2A-06(b). It specifically says that the Maryland Rules of Procedure shall be filed with the filing of the initial declaration. In this case, no declaration has ever been filed pursuant to the B-Y Rules.

An Action to Nullify was filed by the Defendants.

An Action to Nullify was filed later by the Plaintiff. An

Amended Action to Nullify was again later filed by the

Plaintiff. No declaration was ever filed. It is our

position that the B-Y Rules are mandatory in requiring that a declaration be filed within 30 days. Now, I am sure Your Honor knows much better than I the Rules of Procedure governing the filing of declarations in Maryland. Rule 301 provides a number of specifics about a declaration. One of things it provides, and if necessary, I can cite the specific sections, it specifically provides that it has to be a title declaration. It specifically provides that it must contain the names of the parties. It must contain the parties' addresses. It provides here that if there is out-of-state Counsel, it must be certified with his name, address and a statement that he is a member in good standing of the Maryland Bar. All of that is provided in 301-G.

The Action to Nullify has as an exhibit

attached to it a the Statement of Claim that was filed -
pardon me -- the Amended Statement of Claim that was filed

in the Health Claims Arbitration Office. You can see if

you take a look at it -- and it is attached to the

document -- it has a date of September 1983 written on the

bottom of it. It does not indicate that it is a declaration.

It does not meet any of the requirements whatsoever of a

declaration being filed pursuant to the sections that I have

just referred to in Rule 301.

It is clear that the Plaintiffs were not familiar with the B-Y Rules. It is clear that they did not intend

to serve a declaration. The time period for serving the declaration starts to run after the Action to Nullify has been filed. What we have is an Action to Nullify by the Plaintiffs in this case, but we never had a declaration that is filed by them thereafter. So it is our position that the Court does not have jurisdiction to hear the case because the requirement of filing a declaration within 30 days after the Action to Nullify is a mandatory requirement.

I have been able to obtain three decisions from Circuit Courts in Maryland who considered issues similar to this. I have a case from Howard County, Baltimore City and Baltimore County, and those are available if Your Honor would like to review them -- where very similar issues have been before the Court, and all three of the Courts have said that those rules are mandatory rules, and the time periods are mandatory rules, and they are not discretionary. They must be followed.

The second issue is the insufficiency of service of process. Again, I would refer back to the Health Claims Statute, Section 3-2A-06(b). That statute says that the Maryland Rules of Procedure are applicable, and the filing of declarations are governed by them. The Maryland Rules of Procedure on service of process, Rule 103C, says that when an action is commenced, process is to be issued by the Clerk of the Court. A summons is to be issued, and it is

to be issued on each of the Defendants. In this case, no declaration was filed. The parties did not provide the Clerk of the Court with copies of declarations to be served with summons on the parties. They have never been served, and so we say that the Motion Raising Preliminary Objection on the ground of insufficiency of service of process is properly raised because there was no issuance of service.

The third issue that we have raised is that the arbitrators' award itself should be vacated because it is an improper award. Now, the arbitration panel met following a hearing in this case and came to a determination on December 23rd of 1983. That award was served on Walter Cabler at the Health Claims Arbitration Office.— he is the Director of the Health Claims Arbitration Office — as is required by statute, and Walter Tabler then wrote back a letter dated January 5th of 1984 refusing to accept the arbitrator's award. All of that is attached — all four of these letters and determinations are attached to our motion.

So the January 5th letter instructed the panel that the award was unacceptable -- that they were going to have to reach an agreement on the issue of liability and damages. What had happened in the case was none of the three arbitrators could agree on anything. No, that is not entirely accurate. The panel chairman found no liability

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and consequently no damages. The doctor member of the panel found liability and damages in the sum of \$44,000 and some odd dollars. The lay panel member wanted to award \$400,000. So there was no agreement between the three of the, and that was the reason for Walter Tabler sending the award back to be reconsidered again.

The panel members submitted a second award. Ιt was an amended award on January 10th, and it is following the submission of the second award that this appeal follows. Now, our position is that Mr. Tabler had absolutely no authority whatsoever to refuse to accept the initial arbitration award in this case. We refer the Court to Attorney General v. Johnson in our brief, and the Maryland Court of Appeals specifically states what the authority of Walter Tabler is in that opinion, and he says that the Director of the Health Claims Arbitration Office does essentially two things. Number one, he handles the servicing of claims -- the paperwork that needs to be done in that office, and the second thing is he submits lists of proposed panel members that the attorney can strike from. Those are the two things that he can do.

The Court specifically says that he has no judicial authority whatsoever. There is no requirement in the Health Claims Arbitration Statute that there must be an agreement among the arbitrators. There is no statement

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in there that you cannot have a disagreement or a hung panel much the same as you could have a hung jury, and yet, Mr. Tabler exercised judicial authority and more authority than what a Judge could because he said, "We will not accept your award until you reach a majority decision".

The statute provides by reference to the Arbitration Statute a means of vacating an award, and I would refer Your Honor to the course of Judicial Proceedings Article, Section 3-224, and it says -- it gives four grounds for which an award can be vacated, and one of them includes undue means. The second one is misconduct prejudicing the rights of any party, and the third is that the arbitrators exceeded their power, and we are contending that all three of those are applicable because Mr. Tabler did not have authority to do what he did. He did not have authority to reject the award, to send it back. arbitration panel members did not have authority to meet and reconsider their decision. The statute provides only for their reaching a decision, and if an attorney files for a modification of award, and there are specific grounds for that, they can reconsider and modify the award, but there is no authority for reconsidering the entire award such as was done in this case, and it falls within none of the specific exceptions within the statute.

So the arbitrators exceeded their power. Mr.

Tabler exercised undue influence on the arbitrators when he required them to reconsider the award in this case, and we ask that the Court vacate the arbitration award.

Now, the other motion that we filed is the Motion to Strike. I will address that if Your Honor pleases; otherwise, I will reserve if you would like me --

THE COURT: Let me hear from Mr. Hirschkop.

MR. HIRSCHKOP: If it pleases Your Honor, in regard to the first point on the petition. There is a problem in Maryland law in that there is a conflict between the law and the rules. The law has been modified since the rules were first passed. The law which is Section 3-2A-06 in the Maryland Course of Judicidial Procedure says that a Notice of Rejection must be filed within a 30 day period from the time award is made from the panel.

Now within that same time, Section B of that, you must file an Action to Nullify the Award within the Court. The rules B-Y-2 and B-Y-4 have you file within 90 days a notice to the arbitration award and then a petition. We did not file a petition. What we did is with the conflict in rules we took the earlier time period, and we took the law -- the statute -- over the rules. We felt compelled to do that, and it was not something we did arbitrarily. We did, in fact, consult several Maryland Counsel who are experienced in this area.

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The only infirmity they seem to point out is we did not call some things a petition. In fact, what we filed -- if you are looking in the records, Your Honor, the Action to Nullify the Award -- it has everything you would have in a petition. It has the complete substance statement. It is the statement Counsel referred to as handwritten in September -- notice of -- because that is our amended notice in the arbitration panel. We used that to then start the Court proceeding. Everything is in there though. Same Defendants and the same proceedings.

Now, I'm sorry. I called it a petition. It is a declaration. It is a question then of form over substance, Your Honor. I point out that regard to a declaration, there is nothing in there that — other than the address of the Defendants I think they pointed out in their pleadings — that would be lacking. These are Defendants we have been litigating with for over a year. Certainly that would be pure form.

Maryland Rule 3-01C says "Any pleading which contains a clear statement of the facts necessary to constitute a course of action or ground of defense shall be sufficient without reference to mere form". So whether we call --

THE COURT: Let me interrupt, Mr. Hirschkop. I am looking at what is filed up here, an Action to Nullify

HCA Award, which was filed on January 31, 1984.

MR. HIRSCHKOP: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Apparently it has attached to it an amended statement of claim which is followed up HCA Number 82-262.

MR. HIRSCHKOP: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Is that what you claim is your declaration?

MR. HIRSCHKOP: That is our initial pleading to the Court which would meet the needs of the declaration, yes sir. You see all the statute calls for, Your Honor, is the Action to Nullify the Award, and the statute, with the much shorter time frame, nullified the rules. Had you tried to follow the rules, we had been out of Court for not filing the action -- for not following that statute. The statute is the 30 day limitation, and the Court, of course, has a much longer limitation.

We had to follow one or the other. We followed the statute, but everything we followed in the statute, the Action to Nullify has all the substance you would require of a declaration.

THE COURT: I do not agree with that. This

Action to Nullify does not include anything that we would

require here in our pleadings as to a declaration, but go

ahead.

MR. HIRSCHKOP: Well, all the substantive claims are there, Your Honor, is what I am trying to say. When you look at the tendered portion, that has all our substantive claims. Now, with regard to form, Your Honor, they have also complained we do not have a statement of our amount of damages, for instance, as why it was in the declaration. I note Maryland Code Section 3-2A-02 prohibits us from setting forth the exact amount in the claim.

"Initial pleadings filed in any subsequent action may not contain a statement to the amount of damages sought." In regard to that, Your Honor, all that is allowed we did under the statute. What their complaint is we did not do it under the rules. The rules put us in a different time frame. That would have put us beyond the statute. We had to follow one or the other.

Now, we could have done both, I guess, by saying it is a declaration and an action. Once we say that, I think we have met their objections unless it is just the fact that we did not include the addresses of the Defendants or the amount of damages sought.

I point also to Maryland Rule 3-20-A4, Your Honor "The Court, in every stage of the proceeding, shall disregard any error or defect in process, pleadings or records which does not effect the substantial rights of the parties." I point to Your Honor that had we come in and

filed 30 days out of time or 100 days out of time or something, even then we might have said unless it is a jurisdictional question that would divest you of jurisdiction, we might seek to amend. They themselves, in fact, when they wanted to file a response, came into the Court and got a 30 day extension to file a response, and on the same day they applied were granted the 30 days.

So the Court can, under Rule 320, allow for correction of any defects -- do not, however, allow for substance. Now on the substance, they are not prejudiced in any way by anything we have done. We, in fact, filed very promptly. The award, came out, I think, on January llth, and we filed on January 30th. We filed an amended thing on February 7th because of the jury trial demand, but we moved very promptly. It was not that we sat back on our hands and did not do anything.

The statute says you should file an Action to Nullify. We filed an Action to Nullify. What they are complaining we are lacking is the word declaration, and the exact form of the declaration, but the substance, we submit is here, Your Honor. It would be a severe injustice because it does not have that exact form to say now that if you require it be in that form, that we cannot amend put it in that form.

Secondly, on the service of process, Your Honor,

Rule B-Y-2B, the very rules they are seizing upon, say
"A copy of the notice shall be served on all of the parties
to the arbitration proceding. Service and proof of service
of the notice and all subsequent papers in the action shall
be in the manner prescribed by Rule 306."

Rule 306B of the Maryland Rules indicates that where there is a Counsel, the service shall be made upon the attorney. We, indeed, made the service upon the attorney, and this is a subsequent paper under the very statute in which we are proceeding. I point also to Rule — the very statute — and I have quoted them in the Plaintiff's reply, Your Honor, the statute is set out in complete text, but in the statute it says that you may serve on the parties or their Counsel. "A Notice of Rejection must be filed directly to the arbitration panel and served on the other parties or their Counsel."

So again, we followed exactly what was set forth there. We did not follow the rules as if it was just a totally initial action, nothing had happened. B-Y-2 and B-Y-4 set forth at that point what we should do on just that procedure. B-Y-2 says you follow Rule 306. Even if there was no B-Y-2, 306 says that where there is a Counsel in an action, you shall serve the Counsel in the action, and in fact, the rule I just read a moment ago, the original statute says you serve either party or the Counsel on the

notice. So I think we did all we could on that.

Now with regard to the arbitration panel determination, it is our view, Your Honor, that the first thing sent in by the panel was not award. The law in Maryland, as we understand it, at Section 3-2A-050D which is quoted in our brief says, "The arbitration panel shall first determine the issue of liability," and then farther on it says it shall then consider and assess and apportion appropriate damages.

Now before they do that, the law is in Maryland,
"An arbitration panel shall exercise its authority by a
majority". The problem with the initial so-called award
is it was not a majority decision. What they did is "Here
is what one person said, here is what the other person
says, and here is what the third person says". You can --

THE COURT: This is an arbitration panel determination that is dated December 23, 1983, I take it, is that right?

MR. HIRSCHKOP: Yes, Your Honor. That does not meet the law in the State of Maryland that it must be a majority decision, and they shall make those findings. What happened apparently is Cabler went back and said, "You have not given me an award in conformance with the law," and they said okay, they re-met, and then they issued an award which then conformed to the law. It was the only

legal award, and in that award they apparently came up with a unitary award.

Now, the first award does find liability if you just count up the votes, but the second part of the statute, 3-2A-05D, which says "It shall then consider and assess and apportion appropriate damages" was not met. So there was no award within the statute as is set forth in Maryland rules, and under that basis, we think it is a proper award and should stand.

MR. ROSNER: Your Honor, may I respond with one and a half minutes?

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. ROSNER: I would point out that the so-called Action to Nullify in no way was intended to be a declaration filed in this Court. If one will read page 12, the last paragraph, it states "Upon the completion of discovery, Dr. Osheroff will provide the panel with appropriate records and other significant documents".

What would that have to do with a declaration filed in this Court? All they did was copy the same petition that had been filed in the Health Claims Arbitration Act. Now as to the right of Mr. Cabler to intervene with the arbitration panel, the Attorney General v. Johnson very clearly says that the arbitrators are obviously not a part of the executive unit created by the

Court of Appeals.

Act and becomes plain that the unit so created, the Health Claims Arbitration Office, exercised no judicial function whatever, and in order to uphold the constitutionality of the statute, the Court of Appeals found that Mr. Tabler and his office had no right to exercise any judicial function, and what he did here, because he did not like the looks of this award by the arbitration panel, which this decision further says is completely separate and has no relationship with Mr. Tabler's office whatsoever, but is only — they only handle the setting up of the panel period, and then they are on their own because they have been selected by the parties, and he has no right to control their actions, and that is what this decision says by the

Now, he had no right to intervene in this decision. He acted improperly. He was exercising judicial functions like Your Honor would if a jury was hung as far as its decision is concerned, and you may grant a new trial. He has no right to do that. Now, Your Honor, I think it is clear that they have --

THE COURT: Let me ask anybody who knows the answer to this -- what would happen if we did not have this amended thing in here? Do they start the process all over again? Suppose these people on December 23, 1983 filed this arbitration panel determination. Suppose Tabler had

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not done what he did do, forgetting for the moment whether he has a right to do that, what would have the status of the matter been then?

MR. EHRMANTRAUT: Well, it would have been up to the parties to accept or reject the panel's decision as it stood on December 23.

MR. HIRSCHKOP: May I also give my input on that, Your Honor? I believe it was not an award until it was a majority in accordance with law. If it was brought to a Court, I think the Court would direct the panel to render an award according to law or else come back and say they are just unable to in which case is then tantamount to a mistrial.

That is what my problem is as to if THE COURT: you have in effect a hung jury before an arbitration panel, what happens?

MR. ROSNER: Your Honor, I do not believe there has been a case on that, but the statute itself specifically provides that the Court, if it is raised by way of preliminary objection -- preliminary motion -- can vacate an award, and what happens under those circumstances is that the case proceeds through a jury trial or Court trial the same as any other case filed in the Court.

The only distinction is that the presumption that is granted by the statute and that is given to the jury as

an instruction is not given in that case. It is just tried as any other case.

MR. EHRMANTRAUT: Mr. Rosner is correct, and that has been upheld. The only difference — it is a trial de novo under either circumstances. The only difference if the arbitration panel decision becomes part of the record or the evidence, then the presumption applied. We tried one last year I guess it was in front of Judge Raker at which time we were confused by this outselves, and Counsel and the Court agreed that we would act as if there had not been arbitration panel decision and just went on a de novo hearing throughout.

I would like before I forget, Your Honor, if you would like to have these decisions from the Circuit Court entertaining similar issues --

THE COURT: I do not need that.

MR. HIRSCHKOP: Your Honor, if I may just put

my -- it is a different analogy I would draw on that, and

I have this happen in a jury setting. The jury came back

with a seven to five vote in a Court, and the Judge wrote

back, "You have got to either reach a unanimous vote or

tell me you are not able to reach a conclusion". They came

back then with a unanimous vote.

They thought they knew a majority, took a vote and came out. They ignored the instruction that it had to

this is a case where they apparently did not follow that the law required a majority vote, sent it up, and he sent it back saying, "You have to find a majority vote". Now, they had the choice of saying this is all we can do, in which case I think you would vacate it, but that is not what happened.

be either by a unanimous vote or they could not agree, and

They were able to reach a decision same as the jury when the Judge sends back in and says, "No, this is not what the law allows".

THE COURT: No, it would be a little different with a jury, Mr. Hirschkop. You take a jury verdict and if their verdict is that we cannot agree, that is the verdict, and then you start all over from scratch. What Tabler apparently did here, in effect, whether he had the authority to do it or not was if they say, "Our final determination really is that we cannot agree in this," and he, in effect, sends it back to them and says, "Well, you have to agree".

MR. HIRSCHKOP: I do not know that is in fact what happened, Your Honor. They sent and said. "This is our position". They did not say, "We cannot agree. Each of us has taken a separate position at this point". He said, "Well, you ought to try and reach a position". They could have come back and said, "This is where we are, and

we just cannot reach a position," but the same as you have when Judges repeatedly tell juries, "Well, you should try and reach a position" or "You are supposed to bring a unanimous verdict. You did not bring any verdict". That happens all the time, and I think we have to apply some common sense unless it is jurisdictional, and it is not within your power to do that, but this is not a jurisdictional question.

This is a proceeding that went on for three weeks after a year of preliminary proceedings give or take some months, and I think it has to be looked at with some sense of reality, Your Honor. I apologize for cutting in. I think Mr. Ehrmantraut may have had something else to present.

MR. EHRMANTRAUT: The only other thing I would say is that the Chairman in this case was George Shaffer, who I and myself had participated in other panels before this particular panel, and he knew what he was doing, and this was the decision of the panel as he reported it to Mr. Tabler, the initial one on December 23.

I also would call the Court's attention, in contrast to Mr. Hirschkop, that the statute specifically states, assuming the pre-trial preliminary motions have been resolved or unresolved, "If the rejecting party still desires to proceed with judicial review, the modified or

corrected award shall be substituted for the original award. If the Court finds that a condition stated in Section 3224B-1, 2, 3 or 4 exists, it shall vacate the award and trial of the case shall proceed as if there has been no award".

THE COURT: Well, I guess we will find out about this, gentlemen. By the way, Docket Tab Number 7, as Defendant, Manuel Ross, M.D., C. Wesely Dingman and Elizabeth S. --

MR. EHRMANTRAUT: I think it is Palacio.

THE COURT: -- Palacio's Motion Raising

Preliminary Objection -- that will be granted. Number 8

is the Defendant, Manuel Ross, Motion to Strike, except for that is moot. Number 9 is the Defendant, Chestnut Lodge, makes Motion Raising Preliminary Objection. That will be granted.

Number 10 is Defendant's Motion to Stike. That is moot. The granting of Number 7 and Number 9, Motion Raising Preliminary Objection, means that this case will stand as dismissed. The Court is satisfied that the Claimants in this matter did not properly adhere to the Maryland Rules of Practice and Procedure, and for that reason, this claim is not properly aboard, and secondly, the Court is also satisfied that under the Health Claim Arbitration Rules and Regulation, that the action by Mr.

Tabler in refusing to accept the initial award in this matter was beyond his power and it would have to be dismissed and vacated for that reason also.

That is it, Your Honor. Have a nice day.

MR. HIRSCHKOP: Pardon me, Your Honor. Would you allow us to move to amend to file the declaration? You have that power under Maryland law.

THE COURT: That is the end of the case as far as I am concerned, Mr. Hirschkop. Have a good day.

MR. HIRSCHKOP: Thank you, Your Honor. (Whereupon, the hearing was concluded.)

<u>C E R T I F I C A T E</u>

DEPOSITION SERVICES, INC. hereby certifies that the attached pages represent an accurate transcript of the electronic sound recording of the proceedings in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County in the matter of:

LAW NO. 66024

RAPHAEL J. OSHEROFF

v.

CHESTNUT LODGE, INC., MANUEL ROSS, M.D., C. WESLEY DINGMAN, M.D.

BY:

E. Aleva Schneider

Transcriber